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Abstract 
We argue that incorporating the decision of how to organize the acquisition, use, and communication 
of knowledge into economic models is essential to understand a wide variety of economic 
phenomena. We survey the literature that has used knowledge-based hierarchies to study issues like 
the evolution of wage inequality, the growth and productivity of firms, economic development, the 
gains from international trade, as well as offshoring and the formation of international production 
teams, among many others. We also review the nascent empirical literature that has, so far, confirmed 
the importance of organizational decisions and many of its more salient implications. 
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embedded in any production process. Typically, these frameworks jump directly to the 
formulation of a production function that depends on total quantities of a pre-determined and 
inexible set of inputs. In this survey, we argue that this simplication, although often practical, 
leaves important issues aside.
The importance of understanding organizations has been acknowledged at least since Knights 
(1921) discussion of the role of managers in making decisions under uncertainty.1 Some early 
attempts are Mayer (1960) and Ijiri and Simon (1964) who sought to explain the skewness in the 
distribution of pay and the rm-size distribution. Team theory, following on Radner (1993), 
studied the role of organizations as information processing devices: by processing information in 
parallel, hierarchy can reduce delay. Others, such as Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991), studied 
decentralized resource allocation with limited information on unit costs. A line of research, 
following Calvo and Weillisz (1978), also studied hierarchies where managers at each level 
engaged in monitoring their subordinates. All of these papers study organization in isolation from 
the market and do not allow for the study of the interac- tion between organization and the 
economy, as they involve neither general equilibrium nor heterogeneity. Lucas (1978) and Rosen 
(1982) introduced models of equilibrium assignment and thus allowed for the joint study of the 
wage and rm size distribution.2 Consequently, the literature of knowledge-based hierarchies that 
we and others have developed, and we review here, aims to incorporate organization into 
mainstream economics frameworks.
Knowledge is an indispensable input in production. So the ability to manage e¢  ciently its 
acquisition, communication, and use is a determinant of the productive e¢  ciency of an 
organization (e.g. a team, a rm, or even an economy as a whole). We conceptualize knowledge 
as the ability to solve the problems that naturally arise in any production process. The 
organizational problem arises because this knowledge is embedded in individuals who have 
limited time to work. Hence, although the knowledge they posses can be used repeatedly as an 
input in production, the individual that possesses it faces a time constraint that limits in practice 
how often this knowledge can be used. The theory of knowledge-based hierarchies recognizes that 
one way to relax this time constraint is to work in teams, where less knowledgeable workers deal 
with routine production tasks, thereby economizing on the time of experts and allowing them to 
specialize on giving directions on the harder tasks. The organizational problem then becomes the 
problem of determining who knows what, who do they communicate with, and how many
1See Garicano and Van Zandt (2013) for a recent review of the literature on Hierarchies.
2Prescott and Visscher (1980) and Boyd and Prescott (1987) also incorporate organizations into equilib-
rium models.
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goals is essential to comprehend virtually all human activities. However, most mainstream 
economic models still abstract from modelling the organizational problem that is necessarily
famous example), require the collaboration of teams of individuals. Understanding the 
organization of the skill, knowledge, and time of individuals into teams with common production
lopment of key ideas and innovations, even the production of a simple pencil (as in Friedman's'
Most human endeavours, from the construction of the great infrastructure projects, to the deve-
1 Introduction
workers of each type are required to minimize the cost of producing a certain output. 
That is, it becomes the problem of determining how to use knowledge efficiently.
Because the organizational problem optimizes jointly the knowledge and number of mem-
bers of a production team, it links the marginal return of a given worker to the characteristics
of the other workers in her team, and more broadly to the distribution of knowledge and
wages in the population. In fact, labor market and rm organization are the two sides of the
same coin. The link between the two is the scale of operations e¤ect, whereby the marginal
value of an agentss ability is given by the amount of workers he manages. So one impor-
tant application of the organizational problem described above is to understand the impact
of economy-wide changes in technologies that a¤ect the acquisition and communication of
knowledge (ICT) on the distribution of wages in the economy.
Take for example the well known fact of wage polarization. The labor literature has
argued that, during the last few decades, inequality at the top of the wage distribution has
increased dramatically, while, concurrently, it has declined at the bottom. Simple theories
that explain increases in wage inequality as a result of increases in the price of skill have
a hard time explaining these facts. They are, however, easily rationalized by the theory of
knowledge-based hierarchies as a result of large improvements in communication technology
since the late 80s. Better communication technology e¤ectively relaxes the time constraint
of experts by allowing them to deal with more tasks. This implies that less-knowledgeable
workers, who earn less, become less di¤erentiated since the purpose of their knowledge is
to relax a constraint that is now less binding. The result is that experts, the superstars
of the knowledge economy, earn a lot more, while less-knowledgeable workers become more
equal since their knowledge becomes less useful. Moreover, communication technology allows
superstars to leverage their expertise by hiring many workers that know little, thereby casting
a shadow on the best workers who used to be the ones exclusively working with them. We
call this the shadow of superstars.
In Section 2 we discuss this example in the context of the existing literature as way of
motivation. The rest of this paper presents a more systematic survey of the work that we
and others have done to incorporate organizations into equilibrium frameworks as well as
the application of these models to a variety of issues including rm heterogeneity, economic
development, and international trade and o¤shoring.
Thus in Section 3 we introduce the basic technology for knowledge utilization that relies
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on the use of hierarchies. We capture the idea, best expressed by Harold Demsetz, that those
who are to produce on the basis of this knowledge, but not be possessed of it themselves,
must have their activities directed by those who possess (more of) the knowledge. Direction
substitutes for education (that is, for the transfer of the knowledge). (Demsetz, 1988, p.
157). Instead of educating all agents, which is very costly, those in production learn the
most routine tasks and ask for directions whenever they need help on less routine tasks. We
start by setting up such a model, and by reviewing some of the basic results that will carry
on throughout.
Organizations can be introduced in either an economy where agents are ex-ante identical
or one where they are ex-ante heterogenous. We reserve the concept of skill (as opposed
to knowledge) for an innate (or early acquired) exogenous individual characteristic. In
frameworks where agents are ex-ante identical, skill is completely abstracted from. In models
where agents are ex-ante heterogenous, skill can be either be synonymous with knowledge,
when the acquisition of knowledge is not explicitly modeled, or it can determine the cost of
acquiring knowledge, when knowledge acquisition is incorporated.
Knowledge-based hierarchies are e¢ cient in either of these cases. When individuals are
ex-ante homogeneous, they increase the utilization rate of knowledge. All agents obtains
identical utility, although they acquire di¤erent knowledge depending on their role in the
organizationwages just compensate workers for the cost of knowledge. But instead of having
all production workers learn how to do something, most of them specialize in routine tasks
and only a few agents specialize in exceptions and communicate this specialized knowledge
to producers as needed. This ex-post heterogeneity is the outcome of the organizational
problem. In Section 3 we review the basic frameworks that use homogenous agents, starting
from Garicano (2000) which sets up the basic technology and the circumstances under which
knowledge-based hierarchies are optimal. We then discuss Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012) which embeds this basic technology in a classic cost minimization problem, and then
incorporates it into an equilibrium framework with heterogeneous rms. We nish Section
3 with a brief review of the dynamic problem in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) of
deciding when to exploit knowledge by using hierarchies to deepen knowledge in existing
ideas, versus starting a new eld, which requires discarding existing organizations.
In frameworks with ex-ante heterogeneous agents, hierarchical organization also becomes
a device to allocate heterogenous agents into positions where they can optimally leverage
their skill. Hence, these models involve an assortative matching problem between agents
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with di¤erent skill levels. The wage function that results from this problem does not simply
compensate agents for their cost of education, but it values the specic skills they possess
relative to the rest of the individuals in the economy. As such, these frameworks can address
the facts on the evolution of the labor market that we discussed above. Even though the
resulting matching problem can be illuminating, it also comes at an analytical cost. So
the benets of using this variant of the framework certainly depend on the application one
has in mind. In Section 4 we rst discuss Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004), who have
ex-ante heterogeneous skilled agents but only two layers and no investment in knowledge.
We then proceed to describe Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) who allow multiple layers,
ex-ante heterogeneity and investment in knowledge. We conclude the section by studying
the problems that appear when hierarchies operate in markets with double-sided asymmetric
information, as in Fuchs et al. (2014).
In Section 5 we move on to applications of these frameworks that study international
trade and the international organization of production. In particular, we discuss how the
gains from a trade liberalization are a¤ected by the changes in organization that they trigger.
Because these changes in organization are mediated by the level of ICT, these technologies
a¤ect the gains from openness and the impact of international trade on wage distributions
and rm productivity. We then turn to the implications of the theory of knowledge-based
hierarchies on o¤shoring. Specically, Antràs et al. (2006) show that the matching of
individuals in international production teams can a¤ect wages in countries with di¤erent
skill distributions in ways that are consistent with the empirical evidence.
Section 6 describes the existing empirical work related to organization in knowledge base-
hierarchies and its implications. One of the premises underlying the organizational problem
is that the characteristics of production teams are not xed or pre-determined by some
exogenous force, but are active decisions by rms or market participants. As such, these
decisions should change when, for example, rms decide to grow or shrink. Caliendo et
al. (2014) show that, when French rms grow, wages at each layer react very di¤erently
depending on whether rms reorganize by adding new layers of management. Another
central implication of the theories of knowledge-based hierarchies is that, within layers,
more knowledgeable workers are matched with more knowledgeable managers, and so more
knowledgeable managers also lead larger teams. Garicano and Hubbard (2013) show that
this is, in fact, the case in U.S. law rms.
We nish the survey with a concluding section that points the reader to what we believe
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are good directions for further research.
2 The NewOrganization ofWork:Workers in the Shadow
of Superstars
The distribution of wages and occupations have experienced dramatic changes over the last
decades.3 In fact, the evolution of the wage structure provides us with a powerful tool to
discriminate between alternative theories about the fundamental forces driving changes in
the labor market, as well as the way heterogenous workers interact in the labor market.4
The rst central fact is that there has been a clear increase in the skill premium for
workers between 1973 and 2009. Furthermore, the increase was concentrated on highly
educated workers. For less educated workers the increase in the slope is small or perhaps
reversed.
Beyond education, many other characteristics are important in determining the knowl-
edge and skill levels of a worker. Perhaps the best measure of the marketable knowledge
and skills of an agent is her wage. Hence, the labor literature has proposed to use wage
percentiles, summarizing workersrank in the overall distribution, as a measure of the rank
of skill levels. The evidence shows that the winners from changes in the wage distribution
between 1988 and 2008 were those in the bottom and top percentiles. The same was not
true during the earlier 14 years where workers at the bottom of the distribution su¤ered
important reductions in their wages. This phenomenon has been labeled wage polariza-
tion. The nding, together with the convexication of the relationship between wages and
schooling indicates that during the last three decades the mechanism causing these changes
must have a¤ected workers in the middle of the skill (or knowledge) distribution negatively,
while it should have a¤ected other workers positively. Figure 1 show this unequivocally.
After an initial increase, starting in 1986, inequality between the 50th and 10th percentile
of the distribution has decreased slightly, while inequality in the top half of the distribution
has increased markedly.5
3Acemoglu and Autor (2011) present a systematic assessment of the main trends in the data and the
existing attempts to explain them with a unied framework.
4Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu (1999), Autor et al. (2003), Lemieux (2006), Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2006, 2008), Acemoglu and Autor (2011) present all the key facts.
5The gure relies on the Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the U.S. economy during the last few
decades, as cleaned and provided by David Autor.
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Figure 1: Wages Polarization
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Simple theories of changes in the return to skill will clearly fail to explain these facts.
First, whatever theory one postulates to explain the evolution of the wage distribution needs
to predict that the return to skill of workers with less units of skill behaves di¤erently than
that of workers with units of skill above the median. That is, we need a theory where the
price of a unit of skill depends on the number that the individual possesses. Second, we need
a theory in which the baseline wage increases, but the return to skill decreases for the bottom
percentiles while it increases for the top ones. Finally, whatever mechanism we propose has
to be operative starting in the mid to late 80s, but not before.
The so-called canonical modelexplains the changes in the wage distribution as a race
between technology and education.6 In this view, pioneered by Katz and Murphy (1992),
as technology evolves it progressively becomes more skill intensive (that is, technological
change is skill biased). This raises the return to skill as long as the increase in the supply
of skilled workers does not compensate. Acemoglu, in a series of inuential papers,7 gives
precise conditions under which changes in technology will lead to an increase in the supply
of workers without eliminating the increase in the returns to skill.
These explanations are successful in accounting for the increase in the skill premium in
6See the encyclopedic and informative book by Goldin and Katz, 2009, for an account of many of these
facts using this approach.
7Acemoglu (2002) provides a nice survey of the skill-biased technological change literature.
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the last few decades. However, since they speak only about the price of a unit of skill, rather
than the price of a unit of skill as a function of the number of units an individual possesses,
they cannot account for the distinct behavior of the wage distribution for low, medium, and
high skill individuals.
Clearly, the salient fact in Figure 1 cannot safely be ignored so the literature has evolved to
develop explanations that point to a di¤erent evolution of the price of skill across individuals.
Two such explanations have been developed. First, there is the task-based approached
initially proposed by Author et al. (2003) and Author et al. (2006) and forcefully pushed
as the central explanation of these facts by Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Second, there are
theories that emphasize the returns to managerial activities like Gabaix and Landier (2008)
and initially Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1998). The latter set of papers include theories of
organization and so we discuss them more fully below. Here, we only note that they fail
to account for the behavior of the returns to skill for workers with low levels of skill. That
is, these are theories that explain how changes in technology have increased the returns to
managers, but cannot explain why they have decreased the returns to skill at the bottom of
the distribution. As such, these theories are interesting as explanations of the emergence of
superstar earners (Rosen, 1981), but not as explanations of the shadow they seem to have
cast on middle-skilled workers.
The task-based explanation is the best known explanation of these patterns. These the-
ories do not introduce organization explicitly. They postulate a structure of substitution
between distinct tasks in the production process and exploit it to generate complementarity
between tasks. A reduction in the cost of producing computers, for example, will reduce
the need of some tasks in favor of others depending on the postulated substitution patterns
assumed in the production function. A production function with constant elasticity of sub-
stitution between tasks, with a nesting structure that makes capital and routine tasks highly
substitutable, is common.
One advantage of this approach is that the elasticities of substitution in the production
function can be estimated. Harder to estimate and specify is the nesting structure between
di¤erent tasks and factors in the production function. Not to mention the arbitrariness in
dening the relevant tasks to include in the production function. A standard story in this
literature is that the decline in the cost of capital equipment has decreased the price of
routine tasks that are highly substitutable with this form of capital. In contrast, analytic
and manual tasks are less substitutable, and so the improvement in technology leads to
8
higher demand and higher employment of workers performing those tasks.
A similar story can be told to explain the impact of o¤shoring rather than computer
use. The tasks that are easily o¤shorable are the ones that can be specied in a set of
well-dened rules. These are again the routine tasks done by workers in the middle of the
wage distribution. The result is wage and employment polarization as illustrated in Figure
1.
The organization-based explanation of these facts that we propose is not in contradiction
with this task-based approach. It is, to some extent, a distinct specication of the task-based
approach in which tasks are hierarchical and the production function that links the di¤erent
tasks is based on an explicit organizational problem. The exible hierarchical nature of this
theory has the potential to explain the set of distinct inputs used in production as well as
their characteristics. Thus, it can explain for example why are the middle-skilled agents the
ones that have lost in the last decades. Other task-based approaches also link these loses
to agents specializing in routine tasks, but not why these are the agents with intermediate
incomes. In that sense, in the theories reviewed in Autor and Acemoglu (2011), the fact
that middle skilled agents are in the shadow of superstars is hard-wired in the theory, not
endogenous to the evolution of the economy. Furthermore, because the theory of knowledge
based hierarchies provides an explicit organizational theory, it can distinguish in a precise
way between di¤erent types of information and communication technology (ICT) changes,
and explain their distinct e¤ects on workers returns and rm performance.
2.1 Superstar Managers and Increases in the Scale of Operations
A well-known explanation for the increasing concentration of rewards at the top of the
earnings distribution has to do with the increase in the e¤ective market size of top talent:
the scale of operations e¤ect.8 The idea is that a good decision by a better manager increases
the productivity of all her subordinates. As Rosen (1982) argues, a good soldier is useless in
the wrong war. In this context, large returns to talent can be generated by the competition
for better managers between organizations that can leverage the managers knowledge by
assigning them large teams. This argument can explain the phenomenon of superstarpay.
As Manne (1965) rst pointed out, a better concert pianist has higher earnings not only
8See Mayer (1960) and Simon (1964) for the rst two accounts of this e¤ect. Chandler (1977) o¤ers a
historical account of the growth of scale in the American corporation since the end of the XIX century and
the appearence of hierarchy which, he argues, substituted for the old dominance of the market.
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because consumers are willing to pay more for better performances, but also because he
plays in larger halls.9
The rst formal treatment which tries to capture these arguments is Lucas (1978). Lucas
starting point is Mannes (1965) suggestion that: Observed size distribution is a solution to
the problem: allocate productive factors over managers of di¤erent ability so as to maximize
output. Lucas solves exactly that problem. He departs minimally from the neoclassical
production model in that, essentially, a manager is required to run a rm formed by a set of
undi¤erentiated workers and capital. A manger with skill  uses labor n10 to produce f(n)
units of output. Lucasaim is not so much to have a theory of organization, but a theory of
why organization matters.
This model generates a superstar e¤ect for the best managers through increases in the
scale of operations e¤ects as a result of drops in coordination or communication costs. To see
this, let f(n) = n, where  governs the decreasing returns that result from larger spans of
control. As illustrated in Figure 2, an increase in  leads each entrepreneur to want a larger
team so that n() shifts up. As a result, equilibrium requires that both the equilibrium
workers wage, w; and the cuto¤ skill between workers and managers, ; move up, to w0
and 0. The top managers can command potentially very large teams, so the marginal value
of skill (f(n()) at that high point in the distribution can be very large. Thus, competition
for those top managers can lead to very high earnings the managerial earnings function, R,
becomes steeper as technology increases the marginal returns to managerial skill.
In contrast, as a result of the technological change, nothing happens to wage inequality
among workers, since there is none. In this model, what is good for managers is also good
for workers, who uniformly earn more (with the potential exception of managers who change
occupation and become workers). That is, in this model superstars cast no shadow.
For wage inequality among workers to exist we need to model how their skill matters.
Rosen (1982) develops a model of hierarchy where managers increase, like in Lucas, the
productivity of the team, but they also need to spend time supervising each worker. In
this model worker skill (and not just manager skill) matters and, under constant returns
to scale, it enters in e¢ ciency units. Thus, managers here do not care about the specic
characteristics of each worker, but only about the aggregate amount of skills they hire. In
9Rosen (1981) superstarmodel provides a formal model and a complete analysis of this scale of resources
e¤ects in the labor market. Even a top economist, who would be laboring in obscurity, can become an
overnight star selling books worlwide thanks to the reach of information technology. This can happen even
to economists who do not appear to believe in the importance of this mechanism, such as Thomas Piketty.
10In the original formulation of Lucas (1978) n refers to labor per unit of capital.
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Figure 2: Lucas (1978): Hierarchy and inequality when worker skill is irrelevant
R’ 
w’ 
R, w 
α 
w 
α*' α* 
R 
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this respect Rosen shows that this technology can be seen as a generalization of Lucas
technology (Rosen also has a multilayer hierarchy). Namely, y = f(Q) where now Q is the
total number of e¢ ciency unitsof labor supervised by a manager with skill .
Assume again that f(Q) = Q. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of an increase in : As a
result of this technological change, which increases the e¤ect of scale, all managers supervise
a larger team in terms of Q. Moreover, the price of skill increases (as the demand for it
goes up) and thus inequality in di¤erences (although not in ratios, unlike in the empirical
evidence) among workers increases. All workers benet from the new technology and so, as
in Lucas (1979), superstars cast a light, not a shadow, on others.
Can these type of models explain the patterns of earnings at the top of the distribution?
Gabaix and Landier (2008) develop and calibrate a version of these superstar models
of Lucas and Rosen, relying on extreme value theory, where the production of the rm is
the product of talent and rm size, as measured by the market value of the rm. The
key implications of their model are that CEO pay is proportional to rm size, both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally, and that for a given rm size CEO pay varies with median
rm size across countries. Their empirical evidence is consistent with the model. They nd
that the rms market value is correlated with CEO pay in the cross-section. Most strikingly,
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in the time series, they show that managerial compensation is almost perfectly correlated
with mean market capitalization.
Can these scale theories account of the evolution of pay in the rest of the distribution? The
answer is clearly no. In Lucas all workers gain, but there is no inequality among workers. The
assumption in Rosens model that workers are perfect substitutes (only total skill matters)
implies, counterfactually, that in equilibrium managers are indi¤erent between working with
a few relatively skilled workers or many unskilled workers. Hence, assignment patterns
between individual managers and workers are indeterminate. Crucially, this substitutability
also means that the price of skill moves in a uniform direction for all agents, in the face of
an increase in scale of operations e¤ect. This implication is clearly counterfactual given the
evidence in Figure 1 and motivates a model in which the units of knowledge possessed by
workers with di¤erent levels of knowledge are not perfect substitutes.
Figure 3: Rosen (1982): Hierarchy and Inequality when only total e¢ ciency units matter
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2.2 Workers in the Shadow of Superstars
Work involves solving problems. Confronting a hard problem requires a su¢ ciently knowl-
edgeable worker. Multiple less knowledgeable workers will not solve the problem if none of
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them knows the answer. In this sense, the basic nature of knowledge implies its imperfect
substitutability across heterogenous individuals. If one worker on his own does not know
how to program a robot, a team of ten similar workers will also fail.
This type of problem solvingproduction function was proposed by Garicano (2000).
He shows that, if matching problems to solutions is hard,11 it leads to a knowledge-based
hierarchy. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004 and 2006) embed the model of knowledge-
based hierarchies in Garicano (2000) in a context where workers have heterogeneous skill, like
in Lucas (1978). In this model, workers are involved in production and managers in prob-
lem solving. The key di¤erence is that the production function displays complementarities:
workers benet from having good managers (they solve more problems and make their own
time more productive); and managers benet from having good workers (they need less help
and allow managers to have a larger team). Thus, like in Lucas, manager skill determines
the productivity of the team. Unlike in that work, here worker skill determines a managers
team size. The result is an equilibrium that exhibits positive one-to-many sorting between
managers and workers.
In our model, since worker skill a¤ects the scale of operations, the same mechanism that
drives increasing inequality at the top, reduces inequality at the bottom. Namely, superstars
cast a shadow on workers, particularly on the ones that barely fail to become managers.
To understand this note that increases in the scale of operations increase directly, through
the mechanism proposed by Lucas, the return to skill for managers. The marginal value of
managerial skill is team size, and thus any mechanism that increases team size necessarily
increases also the marginal return to skill. The result, as we discussed above, is wage
inequality among managers and the concentration of rewards at the very top. It also makes
it more demanding to be a manager (rises the required cuto¤), further contributing to the
inequality between workers and managers.
The main novelty concerns inequality among workers. In a small scale world, a good
worker is managed by a much better manager than a bad worker. The marginal product
of the good worker is consequently much higher. In a world with large teams, workers
are matched with only the best managers, which are similarly skilled, resulting in smaller
di¤erence in their marginal product. Hence, as the scale of operations increases, the marginal
productivity of di¤erently skilled workers becomes more homogenous, and so the inequality
11That is, workers dont know what they dont know. When an agent sees a problem that she cannot
solve, she only knows that she does not know the solution.
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between them declines.
An example may help. Think of a world with very small rms. The best managers,
say Steve Jobs or Alfred Sloan, run small workshops. They match with the best worker in
the economy and produce the best products. Now pick up a worker who is only marginally
worse. He is assigned to a worse manager and together they make worse (or less) products.
Thus, his marginal product is much lower. Now increase the scale of operations so Jobs or
Sloan manage both workers. In this new world, the marginal product of both workers is only
di¤erentiated by their talent, not by the talent of their boss. The di¤erence between them is
smaller and so wage inequality is lower. In relative terms, the better worker loses from the
enlarged shadow of the superstars.
Figure 4 illustrates the patterns of wage inequality that follows from an increase in the
scale of operations (in this model a decrease in h, which parameterizes communication costs,
as we explain in detail in the next section). Managers, like in Lucas (1978), experience a
superstar e¤ect. Workers are now matched with a smaller range of managers, and experience
a reduction in inequality among them. Also, note the kink in the graph. It implies that
the middle classes, the mid-skilled types, could actually be worse o¤ in levels, not only
relative terms, as a result of the technological change. Exactly what happened in the last
few decades, as we showed above.12
Under what conditions will this mechanism be operational? Essentially, when better
workers allow managers to lead larger teams. This requires a production function where
managersand workersskills are complementary, so that positive sorting follows; one with
asymmetric skill sensitivity like in Kremer and Maskin (1996), where workers of di¤erent
skills are not perfect substitutes to one another; as well as scale e¤ects like in Lucas (1978).
As we shall discuss next, knowledge-based hierarchies have precisely these characteristics:
production takes place in teams, as problems are solved either by workers or their managers
(management by exception); there is positive sorting, since more skilled workers ask harder
questions and thus require more knowledgeable managers; there are also scale e¤ects since
better workers use up less time of their managers and thus allow for larger teams; and
naturally result in stratied sorting equilibria.
We move next to the formal part of our review, where we set up and solve these type
of problem solving production, derive its properties, and show a variety of formulations and
12We develop this model formally below and generalize it along multiple dimensions, including introducing
several layers.
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Figure 4: Garicano-Rossi-Hansberg (2004): Hierarchy and Inequality
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applications. We come back to the issues of inequality, with a more formal treatments of the
ideas above, in Section 4.
3 Organization with Ex-ante Homogeneous Workers
3.1 The Basic Model of Knowledge-based Hierarchies
We start developing a basic model of an economy in which ex-ante identical agents acquire
knowledge and select into di¤erent roles in the organization. Since all agents are identical
before they acquire an education, they obtain the same utility independently of their nal
knowledge acquisition and level in the hierarchy. Thus, this model without ex-ante hetero-
geneity is inadequate to talk about heterogenous welfare e¤ects, but will allow us to study
the structure of the hierarchy and the knowledge acquisition decisions, and therefore wages,
of the individuals that form them. Because individuals have no innate characteristics, there
is no matching problem, so we simply need to determine the (hierarchical) position of each
individual and the knowledge they acquire.
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Production with problem-solving.
We introduce here the basic production technology proposed by Garicano (2000). Pro-
duction requires time and knowledge. In order to produce, a worker must spend her unit of
time and solve a problem. If she can solve it, she produces, and otherwise she does not. She
can only solve the problems she knows, either because of her innate skills or because she has
learnt them by incurring a cost. Thus if a worker draws a problem  and her knowledge is
in interval Z 2 R+; he produces if  2 Z.
Suppose that the cost of acquiring a knowledge set Z (learning all the problems in Z) is
proportional to its size, i.e. the numberof problems in it (formally, its Lebesgue measure).
Let the cost of learning a unit length of problems be c: For example, it costs cz to learn
Z = [0; z].
Some problems are more common than others. The relative frequency of di¤erent prob-
lems is governed by a continuous distribution function F with density f: The expected output
q of a worker is the probability that she confronts a problem she knows, so q =
R
Z
dF . We
assume without loss of generality that problems are indexed so that f 0(z) < 0: Namely, the
most common problems have a lower index. Then, a worker who can draw one problem per
unit of time maximizes her expected net output, which is given by
q = Pr(  z)  cz =
Z z
0
f()d   cz: (1)
The optimal solution is implicitly given by f(z) = c; which equates the marginal value of
acquiring knowledge to the marginal cost: she learns those problems which are common
enoughto justify investing in them.13
Communication and production in teams.
Organization allows di¤erent workers to acquire di¤erent intervals of knowledge and com-
municate it as required. This has the advantage of allowing workers to increase the utilization
rate of knowledge, decreasing the per capita learning cost. The trade-o¤ is that it is costly
to match the problem with the worker who knows the solution and to communicate the
answer. In this context, hierarchies appear endogenously when matching problems to those
who know how to solve them (or labelingthe problems) is very costly. Then, the optimal
way to obtain help is to ask progressively more knowledgeable workers for help until someone
13Throughout this survey, we assume the regularity conditions for existence of a unique optimum are
satised. If the density function f(z) is nonincreasing, the second order condition is always satised and the
solution is unique.
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knows the solution, or until it is su¢ ciently unlikely that someone can solve it.14
The communication cost, or helping costh; is the time spent away from production by
workers communicating how to solve the problem. Garicano (2000) makes three assumptions
about this cost. First, all the communication losses are incurred by the agent who is being
asked and helps with the solution. Second, communications costs are incurred even when
the agent asked does not know the answer, since she must gure out if she knows the answer
and communicate it to the agent who asked.15 Third, h < 1, capturing the idea that agents
communicating how to solve the problem are not directly involved, and therefore do not
spend time, in producing on the basis of that knowledge.
The problem of the organization is then to determine the number of distinct classes of
workers (or layers), as well as their measure, their knowledge, a sequence of classes to ask
sequentially for help, and production and helping time so as to maximize output per capita,
subject to the time constraint that workers use their whole unit of time either helping
or producing. Garicano (2000) shows that in a given organization, any arbitrary original
allocation of workers, knowledge, communication and time can be improved, and thus is not
optimal, unless it has the following characteristics:
1. Agents specialize in either production or solving problems. Furthermore, only one class
is specialized in production.
2. Knowledge acquired by di¤erent classes does not overlap.
3. Production workers learn to solve the most common problems; problem solvers learn
the exceptions. Moreover, the sequence of classes of agents to ask for help is ordered
sequentially from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy.
4. The organization has a pyramidal structure, with each layer of a smaller size than the
previous one.
The key characteristic of this structure is management by exception. Production work-
ers know solutions to common problems, and ask successively problem solvers who know
increasingly exceptional problems. To understand this result, note that any arrangement
14The assumption that matching problems to knowledge is hard is realistic in situations in which knowledge
is hard to codify, as for example when knowledge is tacit. Endogenous codes, where agents have to choose
where to set up the boundaries between events, is studied by Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007).
15Note that the same problem comes up again with probability zero. Thus, there is no learning involved
in communication.
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where agents in some layer know problems in an interval [z; z+ "] which come up more often
than the problems known by those asking them questions, [z0; z0+ "] (where f(z) > f(z0)),
can be improved upon. Simply swap these equally long intervals. Learning costs are un-
changed, as all agents learn the same mass of problems as before. Production is unchanged,
as the total amount of knowledge is unchanged. But communication costs are lower, as those
asking questions are now less likely to confront a problem they do not know. Thus the crucial
insight is that, by relying on management by exception, specialization in knowledge can
be attained while minimizing communication costs.
Given these results, we can simply let the knowledge of workers in layer 0 be given by
[0; z0], that of layer one managers by [z0; z0 + z1], and, generically, that of agents in layer `
by [Z` 1; Z` 1 + z`] where Z` = `l=0zl is the total knowledge in the organization up to layer
` and z` is the measure of knowledge an agent in layer ` acquires.
For example, output in an organization with one layer of management and n0 workers
is simply given by q = F (Z1)n0: In words, production combines the (non overlapping)
knowledge of the organization, F (z0 + z1); with the production time of the n0 workers with
knowledge z0. In choosing the size of her team the manager faces a time constraint given by
1  hn0(1  F (z0)): (2)
Namely, the unit of managerial time has to be su¢ cient to help the n0 workers in her team
who ask with probability 1   F (z0) at a cost of h units of her time. So better workers are
more costly as they possess more knowledge, but they facilitate having a larger team, thereby
leveraging the knowledge of the manager. Of course, the optimal organization might involve
many layers of management, not just one as in this example. The next section characterizes
the general problem using a cost minimization approach.
3.2 Optimal Scale, Knowledge and the Number of Layers
In the previous section we introduced the basic technology of knowledge-based hierarchies,
some of its key properties, and illustrated the way the technology works with a simple two-
layer hierarchy. Garicano (2000) goes further and studies the problem of a single organization
that has potentially many layers of management. This problem was reformulated in a classic
cost function approach in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), who then embed it in a
standard heterogenous rm model based on Melitz (2003).
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Consider the cost minimization of a rm that aims to produce q units of output with an
organization like the one described above. Let the market price of a unit of work time be
given by w, so that the wage of an agent with one unit of time and z units of knowledge is
cz+w: The cost of producing q units of output with an organization with L layers, the wage
bill of such an organization, is given by
CL (q) = min
fnLl ;zLl gLl=0
LX
l=0
nLl
 
czLl + w

; (3)
subject to the organization producing at least q units of output,
F
 
ZLL

nL0  q, (4)
and the time constraints of managers at each layer,
nLl = h
 
1  F  Z l 1l 1nL0 for l  L: (5)
The last set of constraints say that the number of units of time of managers in layer l is
given by the number of problems (or workers), nL0 ; times the fraction of them that has not
been solved up to layer `,
 
1  F  ZLl 1, times the amount of time managers need to spend
with each problem, h.
Given a number of layers, the solution to this problem determines the structure of the
e¢ cient organization to produce q units of output. Practically, it determines the knowledge
levels and the number of agents in each of them that the organization needs to employ. Note
that the problem above does not impose a constraint on the number of managers at the top
of the organization, nLL. Absent such a constraint, the cost function is linear in q. This means
that, given the number of layers, there is an optimal organization that is simply replicated
to produced the desired level of output. A small corner shop will use a few minutes of the
same organization used by a large corporation like Walmart. This is clearly an unappealing
feature.
Larger organization use more complex organizations with more layers in their corporate
hierarchy. As we review in Section 6, Caliendo et al. (2014) present systematic evidence that
larger French rms, in fact, use more complex hierarchies. One natural way of incorporating
this realistic feature is to add an integer constraint on the number of managers at the very
top of the organization. Because of their tacit knowledge and skills, it is hard for CEOs
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to replicate themselves. For example, we can assume, as in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012), that each organization requires one agent at the top, so
nLL = 1. (6)
With this constraint in place, one can show that the cost function is U-shaped in output,
with a minimum e¢ cient scale that increases with the number of layers and a total wage bill
at the minimum e¢ cient scale that decreases with the number of layers. So organizations that
produce more use more layers and produce, typically, at a lower cost. Size gives an advantage
by making a complex organization with many layers the e¢ cient way to produce. In this
sense, independently of any exogenous cost advantage rms might have, larger rms (say
due to higher demand for a better product) will also have an endogenous cost advantage as a
result of their more e¢ cient organization. Clearly, such a large organization is only e¢ cient
if the rm produces a large quantity. For small production levels such an organization is
extremely ine¢ cient. More formally, the cost function is given by the envelope of CL (q) for
all L, namely,
C (q) = min
L0
CL (q) : (7)
In reduced form, one could think of this organizational problem as choosing a technology
from a menu of pairs of xed and marginal costs. Large rms or organizations choose options
with larger xed costs and lower marginal costs and small rms do the inverse. The organi-
zational problem above goes beyond this reduced form choice by specifying the characteristic
of the workforce within the organization that leads to each particular combination.16
Empirical Implications: How rms grow.
A full characterization of this problem for the case of an exponential distribution of
problems, F (z) = 1  e z, can be found in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). Suppose
the managerial integer constraint at the top, nLL = 1; determines the boundary of the rm so
that organizations form as rms. Then, one central implication of the organizational problem
above is that when rms reorganize to grow due to, say, a positive demand shock by adding
a layer of management, they reduce the knowledge and wages of all employees in preexisting
layers. Namely, they employ workers that are less knowledgeable. In contrast, when they
16See Qian (1994) for an alternative hierarchical model with many layers using a theory of monitoring
rather than knowledge-based hierarchies. See Chen (2014) for an equilibrium version of that model with
heterogenous rms.
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grow without adding layers, they upgrade the knowledge of their employees and pay them
more. The intuition is simple. When the organization grows substantially it prefers to add
one or a few experts (a new layer) rather than making all the existing workers learn more.
The latter is too expensive since it involves training a potentially large number of workers.
Hence, instead, the rm adds a layer of management and economizes on its wage bill by
reducing the knowledge of everyone else. In contrast, when no layer is added, the rm has to
increase the knowledge of everyone in order to increase its scale without violating the time
constraints of its managers. Caliendo et al. (2014) present evidence that this implications
are very much in line with the evidence for French rms, as we discuss in Section 6.
Empirical Implications: ICT and the organization of production.
A second set of implications concern the impact of information and communication tech-
nology on the hierarchy and the knowledge acquired. The theory distinguishes clearly be-
tween these two aspects of technology. The key trade-o¤ is between acquiring knowledge
and asking others for help. Technologies that make acquiring knowledge cheaper reduce
communication and allow workers to do more without relying on help, while technologies
that make communicating information cheaper increase the hierarchy.
As expected, both a decline in c and h shift down the cost function making production
more e¢ cient. Obviously, h only a¤ects the cost function when the organization consists of
more than just a layer of workers, since in that case no communication is required. So both
of these changes are technological improvements. However, they have distinct e¤ects on the
equilibrium organizations used. A decline in c makes knowledge cheaper and therefore less
useful to build a complex organization.17 After all, the whole point of the organization is to
economize on the wage bill by using knowledge e¢ ciently. Hence, the model predicts that
such a decline would increase the scope of decision making by lower-level workers, increase
the span of control of supervisors, increase the ratio of production workers to problem solvers,
and reduce the number of layers of management.
In contrast, a decline in h implies that the mechanism to economize on wages by using a
complex organization is more e¤ective, and so more layers of managers are used. This makes
some agents learn and earn less, as discussed above, but some others gain as they manage
larger teams and can leverage their knowledge more. We discuss in Section 6 some evidence
that information and communication technologies do indeed have di¤erent e¤ects.
17In fact, for the exponential case the only relevant parameter is c=.
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3.3 Growth: Exploiting and Exploring Knowledge
The models above study the hierarchical organization from a timeless perspective. Of course,
in reality hierarchies are set up slowly over time. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) extend
the model above to analyze how this slow evolution a¤ects technology use and innovation.
We di¤erentiate between two knowledge-generating activities: exploiting existing technology
and innovating to develop new technologies. First, exploitation takes place as organizations
undertake production over time and add new layers (new referral markets) of experts. That
is, we model this process as the sequential emergence of a collection of markets for expert
services where agents sell the problems they cannot solve to other agents. By allowing
these new experts to leverage their knowledge about unusual problems, the new layers allow
for more knowledge to be acquired and make production more e¢ cient under the current
technology. This process exhibits decreasing returns, since eventually most problems are
well known and the knowledge acquired is less and less valuable.
Second, innovation is the result of agentsdecisions about how much to invest to create
radically new technologies. This investment process exhibits convex costs, so that the in-
vestment, if it happens, takes place smoothly over time. Of course, the economys ability to
exploit the new technology through organization determines the protability of innovation
investments. The rate of innovation, the extent of exploitation, and the amount of organiza-
tion in the economy are jointly determined in the theory and depend on the cost of acquiring
and communicating knowledge.
If it happens, progress in our model takes place in leaps and bounds. After a new technol-
ogy is adopted, investment in innovation decreases and agents concentrate on exploitation as
they rst acquire the more productive pieces of knowledge about this technology and then
the rarer ones. Radical innovation will not take place again until the current innovation
has been exploited to a certain degree. Both the timing of the switch to a new technology
and the size of the jump in the technology are endogenous, since agents must choose how
much and when to invest in radical innovation. As long as the value of continuing with an
existing technology is su¢ ciently high, the switch to the new technological generation does
not take place. As in Arrow (1974), organizations are specic to a particular technology,
and so adopting the new technology makes the knowledge acquired about the previous tech-
nology obsolete. It requires agents to start accumulating new knowledge and start building
new organizations. Hence, inherent in new knowledge is a process of creative destruction
(Schumpeter, 1942) whereby adopting a radical innovation makes the existing organization
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obsolete.18
Progress may also come to a halt if agents decide not to invest in radical innovation.
Specically, the payo¤ of exploiting existing technologies may be such that agents optimally
create very large organizations, composed of a large set of referral markets and a large number
of di¤erent specialized occupations. Such organizations take a long time to build, and thus
agents choose to postpone forever the moment in which a new technology would be exploited.
The radical innovation process never gets started. When the current technology is already
well exploited, agents do not have any development of the alternative radical technology to
build on and prefer to exert their e¤orts on small advances of the existing technology. The
result is stagnation.
Empirical Implications: ICT and economic growth.
ICTs determine the depth to which an innovation is exploited and, thus, the rate of
growth. Consider rst information technology. The main benet of organization is that
individuals can leverage their cost of acquiring knowledge over a larger set of problems,
increasing the utilization rate of knowledge. Information technology advances (e.g., data-
bases) decrease the need for organizational complexity, shorten the exploitation process, and
unambiguously increase growth.
Better communication technology unambiguously increases welfare, but has an ambigu-
ous e¤ect on growth: for intermediate communication costs and thus for intermediate cost of
exploiting a particular technologyorganizations may get stuck in an old technology forever.
The intuition is quite clear. When communication technology is expensive, organizations do
not grow very large and so the amount of organizational learningfor a given technology
is small; so organization does not give old technologies a considerable advantage over new
technologies. Similarly, when communication technology is inexpensive, technologies are ex-
tensively exploited via organization and so technological improvements are very valuable.
Thus, switching to a new technology is attractive and frequent. For intermediate values of
communication costs, large organizations are useful for exploiting a technology, and the po-
tential improvement in technology might not be valuable enough to induce switching. Hence,
making organizations more e¢ cient, by reducing communication costs from high to inter-
mediate levels, shifts the balance of economic activity from investing in new innovations to
exploiting more fully existing innovations, and this may reduce long-term economic growth,
18Previous models of creative destruction, following on the pioneering work of Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), do not take organizations into accountnew products substitute for the
old, but organizations play no role.
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potentially all the way down to zero.
4 Organization with Ex-ante Heterogeneous Agents
4.1 Sorting and Inequality
We introduce here organizations that utilize the skills of heterogeneous workers and retake,
more formally, the issue of wage inequality. We start with the simplest possible model
(Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2004), one where hierarchies only have two layers, and agents
have exogenously given knowledge or, equivalently since here it is exogenously given, skill.
This model generates the results described previously in Section 2.2.
A rm has n low skill agents (workers), with skill zp and 1 high skill agent (a manager)
with skill zm. Agents are organized in a knowledge hierarchy as explained above. Specically,
the n workers attempt to solve one problem each. If they fail, they request help or directions
from the manager and re-attempt their problem using those directions. Normalize z so that
the distribution of problems F (z) is uniform in [0; 1].19 Let the distribution of skill in the
population be given by (z).
The output produced by a team is then simply zmn; where zm is the knowledge or skill
of its manager. This is subject to the time constraint of the managers which, as in Section
3 above, is given by: hn(1  zp) = 1: The span of the manager is limited by the knowledge
of production workers; if production workers are more knowledgeable, they will need help
less often, and managers will be able to supervise larger teams.20 A manager with skill
zm maximizes her earnings R = zmn   w(zp)n by his choice of the skill of the workers she
employs, namely,
R = max
zp
zm   w(zp)
h(1  zp) : (8)
Solving for an equilibrium in this economy is a continuous assignment problem (see
Sattinger, 1993) with two twists relative to standard assignment problems. First, who is
assigned to whom is not a given, but an equilibrium outcome. In standard assignment
19This normalization is not in the original exposition in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) but simplies
the exposition.
20Note that there are no decreasing returns to scale in this production function directly, but only through
the congestion in the time constraint of the manager. We thus have a trade-o¤ between congestion and skill:
a manager can increase team size if he so desires, but he needs to hire more skilled workers to do so. This
implies that matching matters.
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models this identity of the agents is assumed (e.g. by assuming one to one matching of pre-
specied masses of agents with distinct types, or between agents and machines, industries,
etc.). In contrast, here we are marryinga mass of workers with a mass of managerswhere
those roles and masses are not given by assumption. This property is the result of integrating
an occupational choice, where agents can decide freely what job to take, and many-to-one
matching, where the span of control of managers is an equilibrium outcome itself. Second,
agents can decide not to be matched and produce on their own; their output in that case is
just F (z) = z.
Optimality requires positive sorting, that is, workers with more skill must be assigned to
managers with more skill. The reason is that the production function is supermodular in both
skills. A better manager must leverage his higher knowledge over a larger number of workers,
and that requires workers to be more skilled so that they can deal with more problems on
their own. Technically this supermodularity is guaranteed by a positive cross-derivative of
output zm=(h(1  zp)) with respect to zm and zp:
To characterize the equilibrium in this economy we need to describe three objects: the
allocation of agents to occupations (i.e. production workers, managers, and self-employed);
the team composition (i.e., the matching between workers and managers and the optimal
spans of control of managers); and the earnings function.21
Note that the slope of the wage equation must be such that the rst order condition
holds. So, for all workers (zp  z; as we show below),
w0(zp) = hn (zp) (zm   w (zp)) = zm   w (zp)
1  zp for all zp  z
: (9)
Together with a boundary condition, equation (9) determines a unique wage function, w(z);
specifying the wage of each individual zp for a given match (zp; zm). The wage slope for
those agents who do not join in a hierarchy (self-employed) is given by w0I(z) = 1: Clearly,
w0(zp) < w0I(zp) = 1 for all workers (since for agents who are workers w(zp) > zp; and so
w0(zp) < (zm   zp) = (1  zp) < 1). Using the envelope theorem, we have that the earnings
function of managers satises
R0(zm) = n(zp) > 1 = w0I(zm): (10)
21Occupational choice works as in Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), but here there is a matching function
that, together with the wage function, is pinned down in equilibrium.
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This ordering of the slopes implies that an equilibrium with self-employed agents will be
characterized by a pair of thresholds (z; z) ; such that all agents with skill z < z become
production workers, all agents with skill z > z become managers, and those in between
are self-employed. Furthermore, optimal occupational choice requires that for a marginal
worker, w(z) = z; for a marginal manager, R(z) = z; and R (1) = 1=h: Equations (9)
and (10), together with these three boundary conditions, determine the full earnings function
and one threshold, say, z.
Consider now the labor market clearing condition. Again, here the fact that one-to-
many workermanager matching takes place in equilibrium makes a di¤erence. Instead of
summing over all workers and over all managers, we need pointwise equalization of supply
and demand. Let m(zp) denotes the skill of the manager assigned to a workers with skill zp,
which by positive sorting is an increasing function. The labor market clearing condition is
then given by
Z zp
0
1
n(z)
(z)dz =
Z m(zp)
z
(z)dz for all zp  z: (11)
Since (11) holds for all zp  z, and n (z) = 1=((1 z)h), we can di¤erentiate with respect to
zp, to obtainm0 (zp) = h(1 zp), which, together withm(0) = z andm(z) = 1; determines
the equilibrium assignment function m (z) and the remaining threshold z.22
Empirical Implications: Superstars and their shadow.
The model provides some implications also found in Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982).
The main one is the correspondence between the rm size distribution and distribution of
managerial earnings. More specically, the implication that managerial wages grow faster
than ability thanks to the scale e¤ects generated by larger teams sizes (although here workers
wages also grow more slowly with skill). The theory also provides some novel implications.
It pins down, for the rst time we believe, the occupational distribution in the economy:
the less skilled agents are production workers, the medium skilled agents are independent
or self employed, and the most skilled agents are managers or problem solvers. Moreover,
the composition of each team is also pinned down. It is not just the case that more skilled
managers have more subordinates, but those subordinates are also of better quality. This
22An equilibrium with only two layers, as well as a positive mass of self-employed agents, exists only in
part of the parameter space. For example, h needs to be su¢ ciently large. See Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2004) and Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, (2006) for details. Fuchs, Garicano and Rayo (2014) solve
the (equivalent) planners problem, which has some additional measure theoretic complications.
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matching in turn has implications for the wages of workers. As we shall see, all three
properties (stratication, positive sorting, and skill-scale e¤ects) are empirically tested in
Garicano and Hubbard (2012).
As discussed extensively but informally in Section 2.2, a reduction in communication
costs has the following consequences. First, it increases rm size for all managers, since
team size satises the managers time constraint. Second, this leads to an increase in the
managerial superstar e¤ect, since the marginal return to managerial talent is, analogously
to Lucas (1978), proportional to team size, n(zp): Third, and more unique to our framework,
it reduces wage inequality among workers, as a result of the sorting e¤ect. Intuitively, for
any two workers z and z; the skill of the managers they are matched with is closer to one
another the larger are team sizes (formally, w00(z) = h).23
Empirical Implications: Organizations and Power Laws
Geerolf (2014) develops a version of the theory described above but with exogenous skills
and multiple layers. He shows that the distribution of spans of control for agents in rms
with L layers is a Pareto distribution with coe¢ cient 2L=(2L   1). Hence, under minimal
assumptions on the distribution of skills, as the number of layers increases the coe¢ cient
of the distribution of spans of control converges to 1. Using the empirical methodology in
Caliendo et al. (2014) to identify layers (described in Section 6), he can account extremely
well for the distribution of rm sizes with di¤erent numbers of layers in the French data.
The key insight from this work is that the matching process with complementarities that we
have discussed here can magnify even tiny skill di¤erences and lead to Pareto distributions
both in wages and rm sizes.
4.2 Endogenous Skill and Sorting
The previous setting abstracted from a variety of dimensions in order to gain tractability and
deliver cleanly our results. Chief among these abstractions is that knowledge is exogenous,
which forces us to abandon the critical distinction between information and communication
technology. Furthermore, it simplies the organization by determining exogenously that
teams can have, at the most, a layer of managers and one of workers. Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) analyze the full blownmodel where agents are ex-ante heterogeneous, they
23We discuss this further in Section 5 where we also present the exact mathematical expression for a case
that can be solved in closed form.
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can acquire knowledge endogenously, and they can form teams with an arbitrary number of
layers.
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) assume agents di¤er in their cognitive ability or
skill so that higher ability agents incur lower learning costs. Specically, the distribution of
ability in the population can be described by a continuous density function,   (), with
support in [0; 1].24 In particular, ability is dened so that the cost of learning to solve an
interval of problems of length 1 is given by25
c(; t) = t  : (12)
The cost of knowledge acquisition is then c(; t)z. As required for comparative advantage,
high ability types have a comparative advantage in knowledge acquisition. A decrease in
t represents an improvement in information technology that decreases the cost of learning
(e.g., a technology that decreases the cost of accessing knowledge, such as cheaper data-base
storage and search).
The problem is somewhat tricky to solve, as the knowledge acquisition, the matching,
and the number of layers (multiple hierarchies coexist), are endogenous in equilibrium. A
given agent, with a given skill, could well be an entrepreneur, a middle manager, or a worker,
and in each case would be matched with entirely di¤erent other agents. We do not go over
the details of the construction of the equilibrium, the reader is referred to Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006). Su¢ ce is to say that the problem can be solved recursively. First,
the rst layer managers choose the knowledge of workers, then the second layer managers
choose the knowledge of rst layer managers, etc. Finally, entrepreneurs or CEOs (the agents
for whom it is not protable to pass problems to other experts) choose the knowledge of the
managers one layer below, as well as their own knowledge.
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) characterize the optimal organization as follows:
 Equilibrium properties: The equilibrium is unique, and it involves positive sorting,
so that more skilled workers are matched with more skilled managers and more skilled
entrepreneurs. The equilibrium wage function, w() : [0; 1] ! R+; is increasing and
convex. Furthermore, the knowledge function z () : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is increasing. Oc-
24Consistent with the notation in the previous sections, we reserve z for knowledge and introduce  for
the exogenous skill, or ability, of an individual.
25The linearity of the learning cost function c () in  and the restriction of the support to [0; 1] is without
loss of generality, since we can always scale  to t these restrictions.
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cupational stratication, as described above, still holds. The lowest skilled agents are
workers, then the next ones are middle managers at progressively higher layers, and
the top agents in the economy are entrepreneurs.
 Knowledge substitution: Organization allows for the substitution of the knowledge
of less skilled workers for that of their supervisors. Thus, organization decrease the
knowledge (and therefore the value) of less skilled agents. In contrast, organization in-
creases the return from learning about di¢ cult tasks (as the knowledge can be leveraged
more). Thus, organization increases the knowledge acquired by more skilled agents.
As a result organization decreases the marginal value of worker skill and increases the
marginal value of the entrepreneurs skill.
 Wage inequality and organization: It follows that organization makes low ability
agents (and in particular workers) more equal, thereby reducing earnings-inequality
within this group. In contrast, it makes high skilled agents more unequal, thereby
increasing within earnings-inequality among them. Finally, it increases the gap between
low and high skill agents, which results in increases in between earnings inequality.
Empirical Implications: ICT, wage inequality, and knowledge substitution.
The framework above allows for the separate analysis of each form of ICT on wage in-
equality. Communication technology (h) increases inequality at the top and reduces it at
the bottom, as we have emphasized before. The introduction of endogenous knowledge ac-
centuates this e¤ect through the knowledge substitution e¤ect, whereby the knowledge of
subordinates is substituted by that of their supervisors. In contrast, information processing
and knowledge acquisition technology (parameterized by t) increases within class inequality
for both low and high skilled agents. Everyone acquires more knowledge which creates larger
within class di¤erences. The e¤ects on between class wage inequality are thus ambiguous,
but technological change unambiguously decreases rm size, increases the knowledge (em-
powerment) of workers, and reduces layers of management. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) argue that the timing of innovation in these technologies is consistent with the ev-
idence on the temporal evolution of rm sizes, wage inequality and CEO/worker earnings
ratios.
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4.3 Contracting with Double-sided Adverse Selection
In many of the previous discussions we have implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, equated
hierarchies with rms. Of course, nothing in our setting requires the exchange of knowledge
in a hierarchy to take place within a rm. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) shows that,
in a world with perfect information, consulting and referral markets can support the exact
same equilibrium outcomes.
The above allocations put a high informational burden on agents. Absent some a priori
knowledge about the persons conducting the exchange, both the di¢ culty of the questions
posed to consultants and the knowledge of those consultants are hard to assess. A consultant
could pretend to be more knowledgeable than he really is, and the agent asking for help could
also misrepresent the di¢ culty of the question.
Such a setting with double sided adverse selection is studied by Fuchs et al. (2014). They
show that in the presence of these frictions spot contracting is not e¢ cient. However, they
show that an ex-ante, rm-like contractual arrangement uniquely delivers the rst best. This
arrangement involves hierarchies in which consultants are full residual claimants of output
and compensate producers via incentive contracts.
This characterization of the optimal ex-ante contract looks very much like some rms
in the knowledge intensive sector (e.g. in professional services). There, the highest skilled
agents hold all the equity and hire a number of less knowledgeable associates who are paid
a combination of a xed wage and a bonus for performance. Thus, the existence of these
double-sided information problems shows why these knowledge-based hierarchies are often
constituted as rms.
Relatedly, Acemoglu et al. (2014) consider the problem of crowdsourcing, where a prin-
cipal who owns a set of unsolved problems contracts with agents (either his employees or
external contractors) who attempt to solve these problems. They show that the rst-best
allocation of talent, which involves an endogenous hierarchy of problem solvers, is imple-
mentable regardless of informational asymmetries.26
5 International Organizations: Trade and O¤shoring
The theories above are useful to study a variety of issues concerning international trade and
o¤shoring (the formation of international organizations and production processes). We have
26See Fuchs, Garicano and Rayo (2014) for a comparison of both approaches.
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studied these issues in a variety of papers including Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), for
the case of international trade, and Antràs et al. (2006 and 2008), for the case of o¤shoring.27
5.1 Trade and Organization
Assessing the impact of the large increases in international trade that the world has experi-
enced in the last several decades involves understanding the e¤ect that reductions in trade
costs have had on the characteristics of producers and their labor force. Bernard and Jensen
(1997, 1999) initiated a large literature by pointing out the distinct characteristics of ex-
porters relative to other rms. Melitz (2003) then provided the workhorse model to explain
these observations using a mechanism that selected the best rms as exporters as the result
of xed exporting costs. In his model organization does not play a role, so the marginal cost
of a rm remains constant as it starts to export. A rm is a technology that is immutable
to the markets in which it sells.
This is not the case once we introduce organization into the problem. Parallel to Section
3.2, as an exporter grows due, for example, to a trade liberalization, it will do so by adding
workers, sometimes layers, and will modify the knowledge and wages of its labour force
accordingly. Furthermore, it will increase its productivity (but reduce it revenue-based
productivity) as a result of that reorganization. The reverse is also true for non-exporters
that tend to shrink or exit as a result of a bilateral trade liberalization, and will reduce their
productivity.
The above reasoning implies that international trade, by changing the optimal production
size of rms and therefore their organizational form, a¤ects the e¢ ciency of production of
individual rms as well as aggregate productivity. Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) show
that the welfare gains from trade are declining in the communication costs, h, but increasing
in the information costs, c: Trade allows rms to grow larger by selling to more markets.
The larger scale makes using a large, more complex, organization economical. This channel
leads to additional gains from trade. These additional gains are larger the more e¢ cient is
the organizational technology, namely, the lower are communication costs. In contrast, the
additional gains are smaller if the cost of acquiring knowledge are smaller since, as we have
27See also Gumpert (2014) for a discussion of multinational rms and how they determine the hierarchical
organization of headquarters and a¢ liate plants. Marin and Verdier (2010, 2008), and Marin, Schymik,
and Tarasov (2014) have used the monitoring-based theory of organization to study o¤shoring and the
organization of international production. For a more general review on the large literature on organization
and international production processes see Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009).
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underscored above, the purpose of organization is to economize on these costs. In fact, gains
from trade asymptote to the ones in a standard Melitz model as c tends to zero since in that
case the organizational problem disappears.
5.2 O¤shoring and Organization
In Antràs et al. (2006) we address a di¤erent problem related to globalization: the formation
of international production teams and its implications. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) and
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) have shown that globalization has led to increases in wage
inequality among workers in less developed countries. This has been viewed as puzzling
in the international trade literature since trade, either in goods or in tasks, should lead to
increases in the price of the abundant factor, as dictated by the standard Heckscher-Ohlin
logic.28 This is, however, not necessarily the case once we analyze the matching between
workers in global production teams.
The model in Antràs et al. (2006) is simple enough to be solved analytically. Consider
the model we used in Section 4.1 but with a uniform distribution of skills between 0 and
u and assuming that parameters are such that there are no self-employed agents. In this
case we can solve the system of two di¤erential equations explicitly. The wage function for
workers (agents with z 2 [0; z (h; u)]) is given by
w (z) = z (h; u)   (h; u) (1  z) + 1
2
hz2: (13)
The skill premium is just the derivative of equation (13) with respect to z, namely,
w0 (z) =  (h; u) + hz: (14)
The skill premium has two parts. The rst term is the baseline price of a unit of skill and
is determined by the supply and demand of skills in this economy. This is what we call
the competition e¤ect. The second term is increasing in the number of units of skill an
individual possesses and increases with communication costs: the complementarity e¤ect.
The source of this e¤ect is that having more units of skill allows the worker to be matched to
better managers and earn more per unit of skill. As we discussed above, this e¤ect declines as
teams get larger (which results from an improvement in communication costs). In the limit,
28Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, 2012) analyze in detail the factor price implications of reductions
in task trading costs in frameworks without hierarchical organization.
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as h goes to zero, every agent works with the best manager and this source of inequality
disappears.
Globalization allows this economy to form international production teams with other
economies that might have di¤erent distributions of skills. Call the economy above, with a
distribution of skills between 0 and u; the South. In order to economize on parameters,
let the Northbe identical but with u = 1.29 The result is a world economy with a mass of
skills equal to 1 for z > u and equal to 1 + 1=u for z < u.
The ability to form international production teams leads workers in the South to match
with better managers in the North, which increases the price of a unit of skill in the South.
Furthermore, for the worst workers, the complementarity e¤ect increases as well due to
the larger density of workers relative to managers. Finally, more Southern agents become
workers so there is a compositional e¤ect that increases workers wage inequality. Hence,
consistent with empirical observations, wage inequality for Southern workers unambiguously
rises. Firms in the South exit as a result of the formation of international teams.
In the North, the formation of international teams also leads to an increase in wage
inequality among managers. Among workers, the baseline price of skill decreases (the relative
number of unskilled workers in the world is larger than in the North) but they face the same
enhanced complementarity e¤ect. Thus, in the North, if communication technology is good
enough so the rst e¤ect dominates, globalization can lead to a decrease in wage inequality at
the bottom together with an increase in inequality at the top. This is exactly what happened
in the U.S. in the last few decades, as we discussed in the context of Figure 1. So superstars,
and the shadow they cast on workers, can also be the result of reductions in o¤shoring costs.
6 Empirics of Hierarchies
The importance of the hierarchical structure of organizations for worker, rm, and aggregate
outcomes is not obvious. Even though the theory we discussed above can forcefully make
the claim that worker, rm, and economy-wide performance, can be a¤ected by the way
agents organize in production teams, it could be the case that in reality rms just expand
by replicating their operations. The returns to a individuals skill and knowledge could be
independent of the other agents she work with. The fact that the models above are consistent
29Here we only study the implications from o¤shoring to a particular country. Antràs, Garicano, and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008) study the role of local communication technology and the distribution of skills in
making agents in target countries more attractive as production partners.
33
with the facts presented in Section 2 provides only indirect evidence in favor of these theories.
We discuss below some more direct evidence that fails to falsify the mechanisms we have
emphasized.
6.1 Firm Growth, Reorganization, and Wages
Caliendo et al. (2014) use French rm and worker level data to analyze the relationship
between rm characteristics, rm growth, and a rms organization. To do so they use
wages as their measure of worker skill and/or knowledge and divide the rm in layers using
hierarchical occupational denitions. The hierarchical denitions identify a maximum of 4
layers per rm.30
This data allows the authors to create a picture of the organization of French manu-
facturing rms between 2002 and 2007. Importantly, their study uses a large institutional
dataset instead of more specialized datasets of a few rms, as in previous studies.31 The
authors can follow rms, and the wages that they pay in each occupation, as they add and
drop layers over time (namely, as they hire workers in a hierarchical occupation where they
did not employ anyone before). Figure 5,32 presents the resulting representative hierarchies,
divided by number of layers, for 553,125 rm-year observations. The results are quite stark.
Firms with more layers are larger in terms of value added, total hours of work employed, and
pay higher hourly wages on average. Furthermore, a vast majority of them are hierarchical
in that higher layers employ less hours and pay higher hourly wages.
The results also show that transitions between layers are quite common, but mostly by
adding one or dropping one layer. Furthermore, the probability of adding (dropping) a layer
is increasing (decreasing) in a rms value added. Caliendo, et al. (2014) also show that when
rms expand or contract substantially they tend to reorganize by adding or dropping layers.
Dropping and adding layers is also associated with internal changes in the characteristics
and wages of the employees of the rm. Figure 5, shows that rms with only one layer pay
30The paper uses a match of the BRN dataset, which includes rm balance-sheet information, and the
DADS dataset, which includes worker level occupation, hours of work, and earnings of salaried employees.
31The previous literature on organizational form has used very detailed information on a small set of rms.
The best example is Baker, Gibbs, Holmstrom (1994) and Baker and Holmstrom (1995) who analyze one
rm. Other studies like Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) study datasets with a few
hundred rms. Caroli and van Reenen (2001) use larger surveys of English and French rms but do not
focus on the hierarchical structure of rms.
32Reproduced from Figure 5 in Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-Hansberg (2014). The reader is refered to that
paper for details. The gure shows the average wage in 2005 Euros in each layer (vertical axis) and the
number of hours, normalized by the number of hours in the top layer (horizontal axis).
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Figure 5: Representative Hierarchies in France
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their labor force 27.17, 2005 Euros, per hour on average. In contrast, rms with 2 layers,
pay the workers at the bottom only 18.15 Euros and rms with 3 layers only 16.91 Euros.
That is, as rms add layers they hire workers in pre-existing layers that earn on average less.
This is the case for all comparisons in Figure 5. Of course, these gures average over rms
that are heterogenous in a variety of dimensions, and so these results might be generated
by compositional e¤ects. In their paper, Caliendo, et al. (2014) show that the reduction
in average wages in all pre-existing layers is present for all transitions in rms with any
number of layers when one uses time series evidence with rm xed e¤ects. Furthermore,
as the theory predicts, this reduction (increase) in wages is only present when rms add
(drop) layers but not when they expand or contract without reorganizing. In that case, as
the theory above predicts, average wages in a layer grow when the rm expand and decline
when it contracts.33
33Tag (2013) has replicated many of these qualitative results for Swedish rms, and ongoing projects have
35
Overall, these results show that layers of management vary systematically with rm char-
acteristics. Firms seem to actively manage their production hierarchy. It is important then
to condition on reorganization when analyzing changes in rm characteristics. Moreover,
the impact of any economy-wide change that a¤ects rm size will be mediated by these
reorganizations. For example, the routinization of work (as rms grow and add more layers)
reduces the knowledge and wages of workers in the middle of the wage distribution the most.
Look at the top managers in 4-layer rms in Figure 5, who make on average e87.66 per
hour. Their direct subordinates make only e43.6 rather than the e57.43 agents in the same
layer make in 3-layer rms.
6.2 Sorting, Spans of Control, and the Distribution of Wages
Several papers have studied the e¤ect of larger spans of control on wages. Smeets and
Warzynski (2008) and Fox (2009) both nd a positive e¤ect of the number of subordinates,
and the level of responsibility, on wages; the former for a large European rm and the
latter for Swedish and U.S. rms.34 Using 1992 Census data for U.S. Law rms,35 Garicano
and Hubbard (2007 and 2012) compare earnings among individuals who are at the same
hierarchical rank, and show that those who work with more associates per partner (i.e. more
workers per manager) earn more.
Garicano and Hubbard (2012) go further and present evidence that associate earnings
are higher at o¢ ces where partner earnings are higher. Although this does not necessarily
reects that associatesand partnersability is positively correlated (it could be driven by
o¢ ce-level demand shocks), this evidence is certainly consistent with equilibria with positive
assortative matching. The paper also nds that lawyers are stratied as in the model in
Section 4.1. Namely, independent lawyers earnings are in between those of associates and
partners in large law rms.36
also replicated them for Danish and Portuguese rms.
34See also the classic study by Brown and Medo¤ (1989) that relates rm size and wages.
35The data covers the entire legal industry in the US from the 1992 Census of Services, which had a
questionnaire specic for law rms.
36The exception are very large cities where associates of large law rms sometime can earn more than
independent lawyers. Perhaps a sign that in large cities law rms have more than two layers with some
associates operating in middle-rank positions.
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6.3 Information Technology and the Organization of Work
Bloom et al. (2014) aim to separate the two distinct components of information and com-
munication technology along the lines of our work here. Their test involves a key prediction
of the theory: lower information costs shift decisions to lower layers, while lower commu-
nication costs shift them to higher ones. They test this using both decisions shifted from
the bottom to the middle of the hierarchy and from the middle to the top. They rely on
a proprietary rm survey on management practices which they merge with private sector
data on use of ICT by 1000 rms. Although they do not make any causal claims for their
mechanism, they nd indeed that network technologies (a communication technology) result
in autonomy shifting from plant managers up to the center and from workers up to plant
managers. In contrast, the two IT technologies they study (ERP and CAD/CAM) lead to
more decentralized decision making.
This is the rst paper that, thanks to the rich data available, can evaluate empirically the
direct implications of the knowledge-based hierarchy model concerning the di¤erent e¤ects
of information and communication technology.37
7 The Road Ahead
We have argued in this survey that understanding equilibrium outcomes through the lens
of theories that put at their core knowledge-based hierarchies can illuminate a variety of
economic phenomena. The way in which individuals organize in teams to produce determines
the productivity of these teams, as well as the rewards that individuals can command for their
work. Once we view economics through this organizational lens, the evolution of technology,
and its distinct forms, takes a di¤erent meaning. Communication technologies enhance
the hierarchy by making it a better technology to economize on knowledge. Information
technology makes knowledge cheaper and therefore organization less useful. We have argued
that the evolution of wage inequality in the di¤erent parts of the income distribution can be
well understood as a response to the important changes in ICT that we have observed in the
last few decades. Communication technology is highlighting the advantages of superstars
and is making the less skilled more equal, thereby hurting the middle classes. This is what
37Studying the introduction of IT-based credit scoring models in a Colombian bank, Paravisini and Schoar
(2012) also nd evidence that improvements in information technology decentralize decisions by making
managers dedicate more time to the hardest decisions.
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we have dubbed, the shadow of superstars.
Of course, much work is still needed to develop the core theories, implications, and em-
pirical evidence that ensue from this organization-based view of economics and, specically,
the view centered on knowledge-based hierarchies. Particularly promising, we believe, are
three avenues. The rst one involves dynamics and economic development. We outlined in
Section 3.3 some of our work on the topic, but much more is needed. In particular, we need
theories where agents decide on the timing of the development of heterogenous hierarchies.
Furthermore, we need to link hierarchies with the career paths of individuals and see whether
progressive promotions within and across organizations can explain the facts on individual
wage dynamics over the life-cycle.38
Second, these frameworks should be used to evaluate a variety of tax policies, and other
distortions, that a¤ect the labor market, rm characteristics, and international transactions.
The e¤ect of rm size distortions, as studied in Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen, (2013),
and in the context of knowledge-based hierarchies by Torres-Coronado (2014), are good
examples. There is room for much more work analyzing the e¤ect of minimum wages,
other forms of corporate taxation and subsidies, placed based-policies that a¤ect the spatial
location of rms and therefore their organization, education and training subsidies, among
many others policies.
Finally, a lot more empirical work is needed. The evidence in Section 6 establishes the
basic empirical credibility of this approach. But much more empirical work is required to
understand the e¤ect that di¤erent economic shocks have on the organizations that we see
in equilibrium and the implied distribution of wages. In particular, we need causal evidence
of the e¤ect of specic shocks, like trade liberalizations, policy reforms, or idiosyncratic rm-
specic demand and productivity shocks, on organization. We also need better evidence of
the e¤ect that the large changes in technology, and specically ICT technology, have had on
the actual changes in organizations and labor market outcomes that we have observed. Can
we establish an unequivocal causal link? Can we assess the magnitudes of these e¤ects?
One could continue this list, of course. Can these organization-based theories explain the
productivity gap between rms in developed and developing countries? Can they explain
business cycle issues like slow recoveries or asymmetric cycles? We think that they can and
that they will; but we are still far from getting there. In writing a survey like this, one is
always left somewhat encouraged by the road travelled but also awed by the enormity of the
38Some papers like Roys and Seshadri (2014) are starting to make progress on this front.
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task ahead. Undoubtedly, we have focused unfairly on the part of this endeavour that we
have contributed to. We apologize for this and encourage others to actively participate in
this agenda.
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